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Beautiful Truth and Truthful Beauty: On 
the Cognitive Value of Art 
 
Henry Jansen1 
 
Introduction 
“Beauty is truth, truth beauty,” - that is all 
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know. 
These famous lines by John Keats in his “Ode on a Grecian Urn” have been 
the subject of a great deal of debate and discussion within literary circles. 
In this article, however, I do not intend to enter into this debate. Rather, my 
interest lies elsewhere, in what Keats suggests in these lines in a more 
general sense: the cognitive or truth value of art. In an even broader way, 
this can be connected to the question of form and content. As Martha 
Nussbaum writes, “Literary form is not separable from philosophical 
content, but is, itself, a part of content – an integral part, then, of the search 
for and the statement of truth.”2 Such a cognitivist view has several 
supporters and can even be extended to other art forms as well. In his 
inaugural address as Professor of Theological Aesthetics at VU University 
Amsterdam, Wessel Stoker argued that, although art does involve the 
values of form, beauty, and emotion, in the end the value that accounts for 
why great works of art have such influence is the fact that they yield 
insights.3 Nonetheless, this view has its detractors as well, those who 
champion the ‘no truth theory’ of aesthetic appreciation. Among these, of 
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course, would be the deconstructionists, i.e., those who object to 
cognitivism on the basis that there is no truth to be had. Other detractors, 
however, oppose the cognitivist view of art or literature because, while 
holding to a more or less traditional view of truth, they view truth as lying 
outside the realm of art (appreciation). An aesthetic appreciation does not 
require an evaluation of truth claims made in or by a work of art. This is the 
modest claim. The even stronger claim is that the question of truth actually 
stands in the way of proper aesthetic appreciation. It is the modest claim, 
which is the far more interesting and pregnant of the two, to which we will 
direct our attention. 
Does truth itself have a place in art or is truth extrinsic to the 
appreciation of art? That is the question I would like to explore in this 
article. First, I will begin with sketching the case for truth and then present 
the argument against truth in art. How do both stand up to each other? I will 
argue in the end for a more nuanced view of the issue: we need a more 
varied approach to art than what is often presently available. Second, I will 
argue that there need to be qualifications on both sides of the issue. Both 
sides of the debate appear to engage in overly generalized statements about 
the nature of art and its relation to truth or teaching. Given our discussion 
in the first section, we must also conclude that the ‘truth content’ any work 
of art is intended to have must also be treated in any aesthetic appreciation 
of the work of art. Art that teaches unintentionally must also be evaluated 
with respect to what it teaches or, better perhaps, what we can learn from it. 
Art that is not intended to teach need not be evaluated on that score. 
Finally, I will argue that the notion of ‘truth’ needs to be properly 
understood in order to be of value in the discussion. The understanding of 
truth on which objections to the cognitivist theory is based needs to be 
qualified. Here developments in the philosophy of religion can be of help. 
 
Cognitive Value of Art? 
Support for the cognitivist approach to art and literature usually focuses on 
the depth of our understanding of the world to which art can contribute. 
Berys Gaut argues, for instance, that “art teaches us nontrivially about the 
world,”4 and, further, that it “is partly because a work is profound that it is 
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a good work of literature.”5 Gaut is careful to qualify his view by saying 
that cognitivists should embrace pluralism, i.e., the position that truth is 
only one of the aspects that are involved in an evaluation of art.6 Martha 
Nussbaum elucidates the claim quoted in our introduction further in the 
following paragraph by stating: 
But this suggests, too, that there may be some views of the world and how 
one should live in it – views, especially, that emphasize the world’s 
surprising variety, its complexity and mysteriousness, its flawed and 
imperfect beauty – that cannot be fully and adequately stated in the language 
of conventional philosophical prose, a style remarkably flat and lacking in 
wonder – but only in a language and in forms themselves more complex, 
more allusive, more attentive to particulars.7 
According to Nussbaum, the form that the philosophical content a novel 
demands is that of the novel. Nussbaum writes further on: “for an 
interesting family of such views, a literary narrative of a certain sort is the 
only type of text that can state them fully and fittingly, without 
contradiction.”8 The novel form is demanded because of the “world’s 
surprising variety, its complexity and mysteriousness, its flawed and 
imperfect beauty.” Thus, the ostensible, foundational reason for a 
cognitivist approach to literature is that it reflects the complexity and 
mysteriousness of the world. Nussbaum goes on to apply this to ethical 
concerns in literature, arguing that the writer of tragic drama or the novel 
“expresses already certain evaluative commitments… to the ethical 
significance of uncontrolled events, to the epistemological value of 
emotion, to the variety and non-commensurabilty of the important things.”9 
She ties these commitments to an Aristotelian conception of ethics.10 Here 
again, the fundamental issue is one of truth: “The proposal is that we 
should add the study of certain novels to the study of these works [by 
Kantians and Utilitarians], on the grounds that without them we will not 
have a fully adequate statement of a powerful ethical conception, one that 
we ought to investigate.”11 Thus, it is only in literature that we can find 
such an adequate statement. 
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6 Gaut, ‘Art and Cognition’, p. 123. 
7 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, p. 3. 
8 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, p. 7. 
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Similarly, Noël Carroll argues that literature (literary fictions) “can 
afford knowledge of concepts, such as concepts of virtue, by stimulating 
the reader to an awareness, through reflective self-analysis, of the 
conditions, rules, and criteria for her application of said concepts.”12 And 
one of the reasons it does so is because “they are much richer in detail – 
about motives, feelings, circumstances, social relations, and interconnected 
personality traits – than typical philosophical arguments.”13 Here too we 
see the emphasis on the complexity of life and reality emerging. This is the 
reason, it seems, why literature deals with truth, why it gives us truth: it 
yields knowledge of the complexity of the world, which in turn influences 
the choices we make. 
This, however, raises some issues. Is this a matter of ‘truth’? And 
how closely is it connected to form and aesthetic appreciation? One of the 
primary arguments against the cognitivist position was that articulated by 
Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen in Truth, Fiction and 
Literature.14 Lamarque and Olsen do not object to truth in fiction; they do 
not object to the notion of literature teaching us nor to our being able to 
learn from literature, aside from whatever details of history and geography 
novels might contain. They even maintain that we can learn morals and so 
forth from literature. What they object to is that any notion of aesthetic 
appreciation is to be connected with any truth value afforded by literature. 
They write: 
Our principal debate is with those who want a ‘stronger’ sense of ‘truth’ and 
‘falsity’ applied to literature; i.e. those who see the aim of literature as 
conveying or teaching or embodying universal truths about human nature, 
the human condition, and so on, in a sense at least analogous to that in which 
scientific, or psychological, or historical hypotheses can express general 
truths.15 
They argue that attention to truth questions is not only wrongheaded 
because one is dealing with literary works but also detrimental to the nature 
of literary works themselves, which is, as we stated above, the stronger 
                                                
12 Noël Carroll, ‘The Wheel of Virtue: Art, Literature, and Moral Knowledge’, The Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 60, no. 1 (2001), p. 14. 
13 Carroll, ‘The Wheel of Virtue’, p. 19. 
14  Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen, Truth, Fiction and Literature (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994). See also Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen, ‘The 
Philosophy of Literature: Pleasure Restored’, in The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics, ed. Peter 
Livy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 195-214. 
15 Lamarque and Olsen, Truth, Fiction and Literature, p. 6. 
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thesis. Such thinking, in their view, subordinates literature to philosophy.16 
The line running through all these arguments against a cognitivist view of 
art and literature has to do with the definition of truth. In a later publication, 
Lamarque states: 
The shift away from propositional knowledge marks a difficulty cognitivists 
have with truth per se. The truth of art is an elusive creature and, in the 
hands of the artistic truth-theorist, can come to look like something less than 
the notion familiar to philosophers, scientists, and historians. I. A. Richards, 
for example, held that the “scientific sense” of “truth” is “little involved by 
any of the arts” and that within criticism “truth” most often means 
“acceptability” and “sincerity” (Richards 1926: 212-13). Colin Falck 
describes artistic truth as “ontological truth” (Falck 1989: 74) without saying 
exactly what that is. Other conceptions include “truth to” (Hospers 1946), or 
“a kind of transcendence” (Murdoch 1992: 86), or “poetic truth… 
unverifiable… but operative” (Day Lewis 1947: ch 1), or “authenticity” 
(Walsh 1969), or the “concrete universal” (Wimsatt 1954), or “depth 
meaning” (Weitz 1943, 1955). This motley of conceptions shows the 
uneasiness of artistic cognitivists with ordinary notions of truth. But if 
artistic truth is just truthfulness or sincerity or a kind of symbolic meaning 
then the discussion shifts. Truthfulness and integrity might well be artistic 
values, in which case the controversy withers away.17 
Lamarque thus argues, as he did with Olsen in Truth, Fiction and 
Literature, that literature, and by extension art, cannot be evaluated in 
terms of truth. Truth does not equal truthfulness and integrity. The very 
general propositions that literature yields represent “perspectives on the 
world which can be adopted, qualified, or rejected without much impact 
elsewhere.”18 
The understanding of truth that Lamarque and Olsen have is that of 
a minimal correspondence theory, following Aristotle: “to say of what is 
that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.”19 If truth is viewed in this 
way, then one may indeed raise the question as to whether it makes sense to 
                                                
16 Lamarque and Olsen, Truth, Fiction and Literature, p. 385. 
17 Peter Lamarque, ‘Cognitive Values in the Arts’, in Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics 
and the Philosophy of Art, ed. Matthew Kiernan (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), p. 129. 
18 Lamarque, ‘Cognitive Values in the Arts’, p. 137 
19 Lamarque and Olsen, Truth, Fiction and Literature, pp. 6ff. The definition from Aristotle 
is taken from his Metaphysics (1011b25-28). Lamarque argues in ‘Cognitive Values in the 
Arts’ that in order to make the cognitive claim work, the cognitivist has to appeal to 
representational arts since these require some correspondence to fact, pp. 130ff. Even in 
portraiture, however, this is impossible because portraiture itself is not simply and only 
concerned with correspondence to facts. 
Beautiful Truth and Truthful Beauty 
Literature & Aesthetics 25 2015 54 
talk about truth in connection with works of art. This view of truth demands 
that the ‘truth’ that, for example, a poem expresses should be able to be 
paraphrased, like ‘truths’ in science can be paraphrased. In this view of 
truth there is an external referent against which I can measure the ‘truth’. 
The scientific claim that ‘the raven is black’ can easily be tested and 
paraphrased: there is an external referent, i.e., a black raven. The poetic 
claim ‘the raven is black’, with the possible suggestion of the ominous 
nature of the raven being black, cannot be tested against an external 
referent. Only its ‘literal truth’, its factuality, can be tested, and, from a 
poetic point of view, such a truth is uninteresting. The further suggestions 
of the meanings of the raven’s blackness are contained within the poem. 
The ‘truth’ of this cannot be separated from the poem, cannot be taken out 
of that context; it makes sense only within the poem. In that sense, there is 
no external referent to test this. The meaning (content) of this claim can 
only be understood in its context (its form). Thus, poetic truth, because of 
the unity of form and content, cannot be tested by an external referent.20 
How could the ‘truth’ of Gerard Manley Hopkins’ poem “The Windhover” 
be tested? Against the hypothesis that a falcon soars gracefully on the 
wind? But that is hardly a test of the truth of Hopkin’s poem. The meaning 
of the poem is, according to the unity of form and content, self-contained; it 
has no external referent. Moreover, truth in the scientific, Aristotelian sense 
has to do with universals. Art, on the other hand, deals with particularities. 
A novel is, allegedly, about this man, this woman, this place, etc. It is not 
about man or woman or humankind. Therefore, it cannot convey 
universals.21 
The question to ask now is if such a critique holds up. Does this 
theory of truth hold up under scrutiny? The critique appears to have had 
some effect. It is precisely because of such difficulties with the notion of 
truth that Gordon Graham has opted for the term ‘understanding’ in his 
Philosophy of the Arts, rather than truth. Graham does not define this term 
as such but appears to associate it with gaining insight and depth in our 
view of life or experience.22 But does this solve the problem or merely shift 
                                                
20 Gordon Graham, Philosophy of the Arts: An Introduction to Aesthetics, 3rd ed. (London: 
Routledge, 2010), pp. 60-61. See also Gordon Graham, ‘Learning from Art’, British Journal 
of Aesthetics, vol. 35, no. 1 (1995), pp. 26-37. 
21 Graham, Philosophy of the Arts, pp. 61-62. 
22 Graham, Philosophy of the Arts, pp. 57-58. 
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it? The term ‘understanding’ may not be as loaded as the term ‘poetic truth’ 
or similar terms, but it does not escape the problem entirely. 
‘Understanding’ does have the air of a truth claim about it. If I claim to 
understand something, do I not therefore claim to ‘know’ something of its 
nature, something about what is and is not? If art does increase our 
understanding, then it does bring us closer to knowing the true nature of 
things. Thus, substitution of the word ‘understanding’ for ‘truth’ merely 
shifts the problem. 
In what follows, I wish to do two things. First, I want to take a look 
at the argumentation that often appears to be used in the discussion. Then I 
will take a closer look at the understanding of ‘truth’ that is prevalent in the 
discussion. 
 
Art and Truth 
What seems to be operative here on both sides of the question is the 
tendency to overgeneralize, to want to arrive at a normative understanding 
of art: all art and all literature should be like this. Both sides readily 
concede ground to the other. The cognitivists admit that they are not ruling 
out aesthetic experience or appreciation entirely, and the ‘no truth’ 
advocates do not deny that art can teach us something. But neither side 
seems to want to entertain the notion that such concession logically entails 
some adjustment to the theory. 
It may well be that some or even a great deal of art lends itself to 
the cognitive value of truth, whereas other art does not. I have a painting at 
home by a local artist. As far as I am concerned, the painting does not 
require cognitive assessment. I simply love the way the colours work 
together and the impressions they cause in my mind. If it has any cognitive 
value at all, it is that it has increased my awareness of how certain colours 
can play off one another. But that is hardly high on the cognitive scale. To 
use another example, I am not a musician by any means and have no 
understanding beyond a rudimentary knowledge of how music works, as 
more than one person has felt it incumbent upon himself or herself to 
inform me. I still remember the first time I ever heard Pachelbel’s Canon in 
D Major about 30 years ago when I was a college student. I used to study 
in a separate room in the library where music would be piped in over an 
intercom system from the music area of the library. I was studying 
intensely when Pachelbel’s Canon started to play. As it played, I began to 
listen more and more closely and intensely. When it was done, I was unable 
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to study, my mind distracted and disturbed by the music I had just 
heard. I left the library to go down to the lobby where I just sat and 
smoked (still allowed in those days) and tried to find my mental footing 
once again. Although Pachelbel’s Canon has not had that intense an 
effect on me since, it still never fails to move me. I do not know if there 
is some cognitive value to Pachelbel’s Canon, and I am not sure it 
would make any difference to me. If my experience is of any weight in 
this matter, then it seems I’m having an aesthetic experience without 
cognitive value. 
In short, I do not see that we are forced to choose between 
normative theories of art, whether cognitivist or otherwise. Why can 
some art not be simply aesthetic and other art cognitivist or emotive? 
What necessitates art being all of one kind? Furthermore, why can a 
simply aesthetic work not be as powerful in its way as any cognitive 
piece? Graham argues: 
In contrast to aesthetic hedonism, which must interpret such 
commitment as an excessive pursuit of pleasure, or aestheticism which 
makes it an effete absorption with beautiful objects, or expressivism 
which must interpret it as an unintelligible wallowing in emotional 
turbulence, dedication to art, like dedication to science, can be 
understood as an application to the Delphic ideal – ‘Man, know 
thyself!’23 
Why should the pursuit of pleasure, aestheticism, or expressivism lead 
to these extremes that Graham paints here? If a work of art is simply 
designed to convey pleasure or to be a beautiful object, there can, in my 
view, be no objection to that. Does it really need to be anything more? 
A work of art is a work of art, of whatever kind it is, and we should 
probably avoid normative theories. In line with this, however, we should 
also be wary of stating too generally what we can learn from art. Much 
is made of the complexity of life that narratives and/or novels present 
over against a philosophical system, as pointed out above.24 Narratives, 
novels, and other works of literature provide a richer, more multifaceted 
view of the world and people than systems do. Such a claim is similar to 
the case Robert Alter made for the second Scriptural account of 
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24 I have earlier made this case myself. Cf. Jansen, Relationality and the Concept of God 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1995), pp. 214ff. 
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creation, which sees its subject (humankind) “in a complex network of 
relations that are causal, temporal, mechanical, and later in the chapter, 
moral and psychological as well.”25 But Alter is contrasting this not 
with systematic or philosophical thinking but with another literary form: 
the poetry found in the first account, in which, “Coherence is the 
keynote of creation. Things come into being in orderly progression, 
measured in a numerical sequence which is defined by the sacred 
number seven.”26 
And this leads to another point. Lamarque points out that, “It is 
often thought to be a flaw in a work of imaginative literature that it 
pursues intellectual ideas in too explicit or philosophical a manner. 
Certainly readers do not expect novels to argue for points of view (even 
though individual characters might do so – a fact that can help 
understand the characters better).”27 This raises a host of questions. 
First, by whom is it often thought and why? This seems largely a 
modern development. Although Pope’s Essay on Man might be an 
exception in the world of literature,28 in the past literature was on the 
whole concerned with teaching. This was true of the ancient Greeks,29 
and much of Western history. Morality and mystery plays in the Middle 
Ages were also designed to teach. Chaucer and Shakespeare were also 
among those who taught. Biblical literature itself was often included in 
this. The stories in the Old Testament are now recognized to be 
exquisite works of art. The parables and gospels are also considered to 
be literary works, and not just records or accounts. The ‘truth’ aspect of 
these stories is often a matter of debate – what can be seen as fact and 
what role do facts play in them?30 – but they are nonetheless considered 
to be literary works designed to teach something. This is also true of 
more recent literature, of which Dickens’ Hard Times is a classic 
                                                
25 Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative (New York: Basic Books, 1981), p. 144. 
26 Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, p. 143. 
27 Lamarque, ‘Cognitive Values in the Arts’, p. 134. 
28 Lamarque and Olsen, Truth, Fiction and Literature, p. 392. 
29 See Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, p. 15. 
30 See my discussion in Jansen, ‘Poetics and the Bible: Facts and Biblical Hermeneutics’, 
Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, vol. 41, no. 1 
(1999), pp. 22-38. 
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example. Is Dickens good literature? To play Lamarque’s own numbers 
game, there are plenty who think so. But Dickens wants to teach his 
readers something about what is at stake in the utilitarian and industrial 
mindset of nineteenth-century England. The book is well-crafted and 
hangs together as a literary piece. 
So where does this leave us? It allows the question of truth to 
function as a literary criterion. It applies first of all to those works that 
only implicitly teach something. Perhaps, in the end, if I were to learn 
some more about music, I could be taught by Pachelbel’s Canon in D 
Major. Novels and poems, or any literary creation – and this applies 
also to films – by necessity make choices about where to begin, what to 
include, what to exclude. As Nussbaum puts it: “The telling itself – the 
selection of genre, formal structures, sentences, vocabulary, of the 
whole manner of addressing the reader’s sense of life – all of this 
expresses a sense of life and of value, a sense of what matters and what 
does not, of what learning and communicating are, of life’s relations and 
connections.” 31  So, if there is any kind of selection going on, 
unacknowledged, it is important to understanding the novel to determine 
what selections have been made and why. Why that particular point of 
view and not another? What is it intended to communicate? Such 
selection invites agreement or disagreement. While these questions can 
be answered to a certain extent by narrative techniques,32 they cannot be 
answered entirely on that basis. The selection is often also based in 
worldview or philosophical considerations. 
In cases where the work of art is explicitly intended to teach, it 
does become part of the aesthetic appreciation of the work in question. 
Dickens’ Hard Times is such a work. It is intended to teach readers in 
nineteenth-century England about the dehumanizing effects of not only 
the industrial revolution but also the mindset that accompanied it, and 
everything in that novel is geared to that end. Insofar as such a mindset 
is still present today, the novel’s ‘teaching’ is still relevant. It is only in 
recognizing the place of that idea that the novel works. It is not simply 
                                                
31 See Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, p. 5. 
32 For a discussion and analysis of narrative techniques, see Edwin Koster, In betovering 
gevangen? Over verhaal en rationaliteit, religie en irrationaliteit (Damon: Budel 2005), pp. 
140-153. 
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an organizing theme, as Lamarque and Olsen would have it, but an 
actual explicit goal of the novel. 
Lamarque raises another point, however, concerning the reading 
of Hume’s Dialogues on Human Nature as philosophy and as literature. 
If this is read as the latter, he asks, where one is not asked to endorse the 
philosophical argument, “Could not the bishop as well as the atheist 
admire its literary qualities? Arguably the literary value of such a work 
is not vested in its philosophical soundness but in its structure and tone, 
its use of dialogue as rhetorical device, its wit, its irony, or the 
consonance of ends and means.”33 In the first place, if one takes the 
unity of form and content seriously, it is incomprehensible to me how 
one could separate the literary qualities from the argument. Is it not so 
that the argument proceeds by way of the literary devices?34 If one were 
to disagree with a certain step in the argument where a literary device 
was used to bring home a point, would that not affect one’s assessment 
of the work aesthetically as well? Moreover, apart from that, does 
appreciation of a work as literature entail that one appreciate all aspects 
of the work? Might one not claim, for instance and hypothetically, that 
Hume’s use of irony and wit is superb, but his use of dialogue as a 
rhetorical device is faulty or defective? Why, then, could one not argue 
that, while his use of literary devices is brilliant, they are also misguided 
or wrong, and thus, for a bishop, his work to that extent is aesthetically 
displeasing? It is not at all clear why one should have a positive view of 
all the so-called literary aspects in order to appreciate the work in a 
literary sense. 
One could go even further here. It could be argued that if the 
theme of Dickens’ Hard Times was the ‘condition-of-England’ question, 
along with poverty, industrialization, etc., and if the truth of the novel is 
tied to that theme, then Hard Times becomes of mere historical 
interest.35 On the one hand, one is inclined to say: Would that it were 
only of historical interest! But the ‘condition-of-England’ question is not 
the theme of Dickens’ novel as such. The theme is the dehumanizing 
                                                
33 Lamarque, ‘Cognitive Values in the Arts’, p. 132. 
34 Koster arrived at the same conclusion. See Koster, In betovering gevangen?, pp. 340-45. 
35 Lamarque and Olsen, Truth, Fiction and Literature, p. 426. One does wonder, however, 
what would be wrong as such with something being of ‘mere’ historical interest. 
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effects of industrialization and utilitarianism, and dehumanization in the 
name of modernization and globalization is still a very current concern, 
paralleling those of nineteenth-century England. To be sure, this can be 
said in other ways and perhaps more direct ways. But the point of the 
novel is not simply that: rather, what the novel revolves around is the 
whole presentation of two ways of life at odds with each other (the life 
of the circus and the life of the utilitarian Coketown), and all the 
elements of the novel are geared toward that. It is not simply about the 
‘condition-of-England’ question. Rather, it dramatizes two ways of life 
and the consequences of those ways of life for human beings. It is not 
what is on the surface of the ‘condition-of-England’ that continues to 
make the novel powerful but what lies underneath it. The way the story 
is told, the way the characters are drawn and characterized all reinforce 
the idea behind the novel. And it is that particular way of telling that 
makes the novel so pointed and unforgettable. 
But such would be, in the viewpoint of the ‘no truth’ theory 
advocated by Lamarque and Olsen, simply a perspective, an insight, and 
not the same as a propositional truth, an understanding. What about the 
theory of truth they claim lies at the basis of the argument? To that issue 
we will now turn. 
 
Truth as a Criterion 
As pointed out above, Lamarque and Olsen argue for a propositional 
definition of truth based on Aristotle. At the same time, they reject the 
equation of ‘truth’ with terms like ‘sincerity’, ‘authenticity’, etc.36 Here 
Lamarque and Olsen seem to be on fairly certain ground. And many 
cognitivists are with agreement on them on this score. That is why 
Graham prefers to speak of ‘understanding’ rather than truth. M.W. 
Rowe also appears to accept that definition of truth and spends the 
majority of an article arguing against Lamarque and Olsen for the 
importance of data and facts for literature.37 What Rowe has to say on 
this issue is important in itself, but it seems to me that such attempts 
                                                
36 See p. 53 above and Lamarque, ‘Cognitive Values in the Arts’, p. 129. 
37 M. W. Rowe, ‘Lamarque and Olsen on Literature and Truth’, Philosophical Quarterly, 
vol. 47, no. 188 (1997), pp. 322-341. 
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approach the issue wrongly. If truth is understood in this way, then it 
seems that Lamarque and Olsen have won their case. For if it is indeed 
only insights and ill-defined ‘ontological truth’ that literature yields, 
then they are right: literature will not be able to meet the standards of 
‘truth’, at least as far as fiction is concerned.38 As stated above, the 
attempt to replace ‘truth’ by ‘understanding’ does not solve the problem. 
The question to ask is: Is that the only view of truth available – 
propositional truth that fits the correspondence model? 
Is, then, that definition of truth as basic as Lamarque and Olsen 
claim it is? Is the minimal correspondence theory of truth sufficient? 
This seems difficult to maintain. What people generally hold as true 
involves much more than such a minimal correspondence theory. Works 
of literature offer models by which to understand life. To respond to a 
novel by saying ‘This is true’ or ‘This is not true’ is not simply to accept 
or reject a perspective as the final word on an issue. It is to accept or 
reject a truth claim about how the world is, about how I am to 
understand the world. If I read a novel that asks me to accept premises 
or conclusions that go against what I have learned and been taught to 
believe, such as The Da Vinci Code, whatever other literary qualities the 
novel might have, the fact that it fails to present a convincing case is a 
matter of aesthetic judgement. Here truth and aesthetics converge. If the 
facts do not add up, I can reject the conclusion and the novel as 
aesthetically unsound. I am accepting or rejecting the model or 
paradigm. 
But is this, again, a matter of accepting or rejecting 
‘understanding’ or ‘truth?’ Is this not merely a matter of a perspective 
that we can accept or reject? Certainly it is a perspective, but that does 
not make it less true as such. A parallel here may be found in religion. 
Religions have never viewed truth simply in the straightforward 
propositional way that Lamarque and Olsen advocate. Hendrik M. 
Vroom has argued that basic experiences such as suffering, 
responsibility, finitude, etc. can produce a change in one’s thinking: 
                                                
38 The exception, of course, would be literary creations where ‘facts’ do seem to matter. 
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these experiences make truth claims.39 This is also the case with stories, 
either fictional or historical: they make a truth claim and demand a 
response. In an earlier publication, Religions and the Truth, Vroom 
argued for a multiplicity of truth. He distinguishes five types of truth in 
religion, of which only the first three of interest to us here.40 The first 
two are doctrina and veritates. The former has to do with public 
knowledge. For those most familiar with Christian circles this would be 
what is covered in catechisms and confessions of faith.41 In a more 
secular worldview, this could be viewed as surface knowledge. But even 
this is more than simply knowledge of facts and data. It also concerns a 
way of looking at the world. Veritates is appropriated religious truth and 
concerns the interiorization of such truth, which involves a shift in 
perspective. 42 In this phase we do not merely assent to the doctrines on 
an objective level but come to have a different perspective on reality. 
The third category, religio vera, is lived truth. 43  Here religions 
emphasize that truth is not only a matter of knowing but also a matter of 
being. Truth is not just a matter of what we claim; it is also a matter of 
what we do, of how we are. There is a steady progression in truth here: 
from objective truth to interiorization of the truth to lived truth. In the 
final stage of the progression truth becomes more than factual and 
propositional truth. 
Although Vroom focuses on biblical and or religious/worldview 
stories, his point holds for novels or poems as well. Without equating art 
with religion or making it a substitute for religion, works of art and 
literature certainly function in this way. A full appreciation of Hopkins’ 
“The Windhover” requires our assent that this is true in a deep, 
profound way, beyond minimal correspondence. We read the poem and 
                                                
39 Hendrik M. Vroom, ‘Religious Truth: Seeing Things as They Really Are. Experience, 
Insight, and Religious Stories’, in The Question of Theological Truth: Philosophical and 
Interreligious Perspectives, eds Frederiek Depoortere and Magdalen Lambkin (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 2012), pp. 115-135. 
40 Hendrik M. Vroom, Religions and the Truth: Philosophical Reflections and Perspectives 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989), pp. 302ff. Less relevant are the fourth, the experience 
of truth (intellectus verus), and the fifth, the transcendent itself as truth (veritas). 
41 Vroom, Religions and the Truth, p. 303. 
42 Vroom, Religions and the Truth, pp. 307, 310. 
43 Vroom, Religions and the Truth, p. 311. 
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say: ‘Yes, this is true!’ A reading of Hard Times demands the same kind 
of assent: ‘This is true; this is the way the world is!’ We may know and 
assent to the belief that utilitarianism and industrialization dehumanizes 
people. But it is in reading Hard Times that we interiorize this 
knowledge. By sympathizing with certain characters, like Louisa and 
Sissy, and developing an antagonism towards others like Bounderby and 
Gradgrind, by experiencing the ugliness and squalor of Coketown as 
presented by Dickens’ storytelling talents, we appropriate this initial 
understanding. We see points of contact in the novel between the 
characters and ourselves, between the world as we experience it and the 
world as described in the novel, and the two worlds begin to merge to a 
certain extent. In this process the doctrina become veritates. This 
involves a shift in perspective. It is no longer merely objective but 
subjective. It becomes literally part of our consciousness. As a result, 
we begin to act and behave in ways that go counter to the bad effects of 
the industrial revolution and its way of viewing the world. 
This is what I think what Lamarque calls ‘this motley of 
conceptions’ concerning ‘truth’ finally means. Literature is too serious 
not to be approached this way. It can persuade us to do bad acts or to act 
in ways that are undesirable. Or it can increase our understanding. It is 
in this way that terms like ‘understanding’ are connected to truth. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article we have looked at the question of truth in art and, more 
narrowly, in literature. Over against some vague thinking about the 
concept of truth in art and literature we attempted to provide some 
clarity about the nature of truth. We need a wider conception of art and 
of art’s purposes. Not all art is cognitivist in nature; it does not need to 
be. We do not need a normative description of art. Different types of art 
work in different ways, and we should accept that: a true pluralism of 
views concerning art. While admitting that the cognitive approach to art 
does not cover all art, it also allows us to evaluate art that is cognitivist 
in nature, either intentionally or unintentionally, in terms of the issue of 
truth. 
The issue of truth, however, is not to be limited to the 
understanding of truth as propositional or factual. As we have seen, 
drawing upon Vroom’s reflections on truth in religion, truth is more 
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variegated. There are degrees of truth and degrees of assent. Literature 
that is cognitivist in nature will demand our assent or rejection of its 
claims. If we assent to those claims, we interiorize them and are 
influenced by them in our way of life and the choices we make. This is 
what leads us to say of such a work of art: a beautiful truth or a truthful 
beauty. The two go hand in hand. 
 
 
